In a unanimous decision authored by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled today that all workers—regardless of whether they are “majority-group plaintiffs” or “minority-group plaintiffs”—must be treated equally when bringing disparate treatment claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
What happened in Ames?
Marlean Ames, a straight woman in Ohio, alleged that her employer denied her a promotion and then demoted her, favoring two less qualified gay employees. The trial court dismissed her claim using the now defunct “background circumstances” test. The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding that as a member of a “majority” group of straight employees, Ames had not shown “background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”
The “background circumstances” test was first applied by the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in 1981 and later adopted by the United States Courts of Appeals for the Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. The test required plaintiffs who are members of majority groups to satisfy an extra prima facie step in addition to the other traditional prima facie elements under the McDonnell Douglas framework—“background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”
Today’s Supreme Court ruling wipes that extra prima facie step off the books. The Supreme Court held that “Title VII’s disparate-treatment provision draws no distinctions between majority-group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs.” Instead, that provision makes it unlawful to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual” based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Gorsuch, concurred in the opinion but took it a step further. He warned against “atextual” legal rules and frameworks (such as the “background circumstances” test), questioning the McDonnell Douglas framework altogether and suggesting it too may lack textual support in Title VII.
What does today’s ruling mean for employers?
The takeaway is clear: discrimination claims must be evaluated under the same evidentiary rules, regardless of who brings them. The familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework still applies, but courts can no longer impose stricter proof requirements on plaintiffs in majority groups.
Employers in the affected circuits must now adjust. And with the “background circumstances” barrier removed, claims from majority-group employees may become more common—although Ames’ counsel argued that circuits without the “background circumstances” rule have not seen a flood of such claims. Either way, more of these claims are now likely to survive summary judgment.
Bottom line: discrimination is discrimination—no matter who the plaintiff is. Employers must ensure that employment decisions are fair, documented, and justifiable, as all discrimination claims are now on equal footing in court.